What a search target looks like at public-company scale
Weyco Group is a family-controlled footwear business — Florsheim, Nunn Bush, Stacy Adams and BOGS — with $276.2m of revenue and $32.2m of EBITDA in FY2025. Three characteristics make it a textbook leveraged buyout candidate.
It is debt-free, carrying roughly $100m of cash and securities against no borrowings, with an undrawn revolver. It is capital-light: FY2025 capital expenditure was $1.8m, about 0.6% of sales, so almost all EBITDA converts to cash available for debt service. And it is durable — four established brands across dress, casual and outdoor footwear, sold through wholesale and direct channels.
The FY2025 numbers also carry a visible problem. Revenue fell 5% and gross margin compressed from 45.3% to 43.2%, driven by roughly $19.8m of tariffs paid under the IEEPA regime. Operating earnings fell from $36.6m to $32,152.0m before depreciation. A buyer has to form a view on whether that compression is structural or temporary.
Sponsor paper, not megafund paper
The capital structure is built for an independent sponsor rather than a large-cap fund: bank debt sized to cash flow, a seller note to bridge the gap, and management rolling equity to stay aligned.
| Sources | $m | × EBITDA | Uses | $m |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Senior term loan | 88.4 | 2.75× | Enterprise value | 176.9 |
| Seller note | 32.2 | 1.00× | Cash to balance sheet | 5.0 |
| Management rollover | 6.6 | — | Transaction fees (2.5%) | 4.4 |
| Sponsor equity | 59.1 | — | ||
| Total sources | 186.3 | — | Total uses | 186.3 |
Entry is struck at 5.5× LTM EBITDA, within the 4–6× range where independent sponsors transact in the lower middle market. The public market cross-check is instructive: at roughly $35 a share, Weyco's listed equity implies about 10× EBITDA. The sponsor case is underwritten on cash-flow value, not on the quoted price.
Why the seller note matters
The seller note does two things a bank loan cannot. It bridges the gap between what a lender will advance and what the seller wants, without the sponsor funding it in equity. And it keeps the seller economically exposed after closing — useful in a family-controlled business where the transition is part of the risk.
The constraint is debt service coverage, not leverage
Lower-middle-market lenders underwrite to DSCR — cash flow available for debt service divided by the payments due. The model tests it every year against a 1.25× covenant.
| Year | FY26E | FY27E | FY28E | FY29E | FY30E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DSCR | 1.40× | 1.66× | 1.94× | 2.12× | 2.48× |
| Senior debt outstanding ($m) | 73.7 | 55.9 | 35.5 | 14.6 | 0.0 |
The senior facility amortises 10% a year with a 75% excess-cash-flow sweep, retiring the full $88.4m before exit. The seller note is a standby bullet, repaid at exit. The headroom is comfortable from year one — a consequence of buying a business that converts earnings to cash almost fully.
Where the money actually comes from
The value-creation bridge is the honest test of any buyout. It attributes the change in equity value to its three sources, and it is where most models quietly rely on the exit multiple being higher than the entry one.
| Driver | Equity value ($m) | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Debt paydown and cash build | 114.1 | 59% |
| EBITDA growth | 83.6 | 43% |
| Multiple expansion | 0.0 | 0% |
| Less: transaction fees | (4.4) | (2%) |
| Total value created | 193.3 | 100% |
Zero value is assumed from multiple expansion. The exit is struck at the same 5.5× paid at entry. If multiples re-rate, that is upside the model does not claim.
| Metric | Sponsor (gross) | Investor (net of promote) |
|---|---|---|
| Equity invested at close | 65.7 | — |
| Exit equity value (FY30) | 258.9 | — |
| MOIC | 3.9× | 3.2× |
| IRR | 32% | 26% |
The waterfall
Distributions follow the structure investors in this market actually sign: return of invested capital, then an 8% preferred return, then a promote on the residual that tiers with performance — 20% above the preferred, 25% above 2.0× MOIC, 30% above 3.0×.
A model you cannot defend is a drawing
Every operating figure traces to Weyco's SEC filings — the FY2025 Form 10-K filed 13 March 2026 and the Q1 2026 Form 8-K filed 5 May 2026. The workbook carries a dedicated audit tab that tests the structure rather than asserting it.
The audit tab is not decoration. It is the difference between a model that produces a number and one that can be handed to a lender or an investment committee.
Conditionally attractive at or below 5.5×
The deal clears a 1.40× minimum DSCR in every year, returns 3.9× and 32% gross on assumptions that credit nothing to multiple expansion, and carries asymmetric upside from a tariff refund the base case ignores. The returns are produced by de-leveraging a cash-generative business, which is the version of a buyout that does not require the market to cooperate.
What would need diligence
- Tariffs. The $18.6m refund claim is live but unresolved. The base case assumes only partial margin recovery.
- Brand mix. Dress footwear faces a structural casualisation trend; Florsheim and the casual lines are the offset. Brand-level cohort analysis would be the first workstream.
- Sourcing. Roughly two Chinese suppliers each exceed 10% of purchases. Diversification into India, Vietnam and Cambodia is underway but incomplete.
- Control. Family ownership exceeds 50%. Rollover terms and the transition are the gating items — not the financing.